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For more than thirty years, the United States has
maintained an economic embargo against the socialist
government of Cuba. In light of the decline of communism in
Europe and the failing Cuban economy, the United States
decided to tighten this embargo through the enactment of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 ("CDA").' By restricting U.S.
foreign subsidiaries2 and pressuring foreign countries from
trading with Cuba, the statute aims to increase the level of
economic and social unrest that would cause the Cuban people
to demand democratic political reform.'
Until the enactment of the CDA, many nations supported
the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The CDA, however, has caused
great international concern and protest. Specifically, foreign
nations object to section 1706(a)4 of the CDA because it
" J.D. Candidate, 1994, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A.,
1991, Harvard-Radcliffe College. With love, I dedicate this Comment to my
brother, Tommy, and to my parents, Wai King and Kit Wong.
'Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575
(1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C.S. §§ 6001-10 (1993)).
' This Comment uses the term "U.S. foreign subsidiaries" to refer to
U.S.-owned or controlled subsidiaries located in a foreign country.
' See infra Section 3 for a detailed description of the provisions of the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
" The Cuban Democracy Act § 1706(a) provides:
(a) Prohibition on certain transactions between certain United
States firms and Cuba: (1) Prohibition. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no license may be issued for any transaction
described in section 515.559 of title 31, Code ofFederal Regulations,
as in effect on July 1, 1989;
(2) Applicability to Existing Contracts. Paragraph (1) shall not
affect any contract entered into before the date of the enactment of
this Act [October 23, 1992].
22 U.S.C.S. § 6005(a) (1993). The provision of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations to which the Cuban Democracy Act § 1706(a) refers provides:
"Specific licenses will be issued in appropriate cases for certain categories
of transactions between U.S.-owned or controlled firms in third countries
and Cuba, where local law requires, or policy in the third country favors,
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prohibits all foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from
trading with Cuba.5 These countries' contend that section
1706(a) hurts their economic interests and usurps their
authority to fashion laws reflecting national priorities. For
these reasons, several nations have threatened to invoke
blocking statutes to prevent U.S. subsidiaries operating within
their territories from complying with this provision.7
This Comment examines the tension between section
1706(a) and the norms of public international law, as well as
the economic impact of this provision upon the U.S. economy.
Section 2 reviews the history of U.S. economic sanctions
against Cuba. Section 3 presents an overview of the purposes
and provisions of the CDA. Section 4 discusses the
unconditionality of section 1706(a) and its incompatibility with
public international law. Section 5 examines the condition of
the Cuban market, the likely impact of section 1706(a) on U.S.
businesses, and the potential benefits that Cuban trade would
have on the U.S. economy. This Comment concludes by
arguing for the repeal of section 1706(a) and for an end to the
U.S. embargo against Cuba.
trade with Cuba." 31 C.F.R. § 515.559(b) (1993).
' The scope of this Comment is primarily confined to the discussion of
§ 1706(a).
6 Within the international community, Canada, Britain, and the
European Community ("E.C.") have been the most vocal in opposing the
provision. Cuba Plays Down U.S. Sanctions'Impact on Sugar Trade, Reuter
Bus. Rep., Oct. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
Specifically, the E.C. Ruling Commission warned that "the extension of the
U.S. trade embargo against Cuba [which jeopardizes the E.C.'s $500 million
trade with Cuba] has the potential to cause grave damage to the
transatlantic relationship." Martin Sieff, U.S. Bill on Cuban Trade Angers
Canada, E.C., WASH. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at A7. Similarly, Canada
challenged the U.S. measure, which would affect $20 million worth of trade
between Canadian-based subsidiaries and Cuba. Canada Seeks to Block
Curbs on Trade with Cuba, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1992, at B6.
T Responding to the enactment of the CDA, Canada issued an order
forbidding U.S. subsidiaries located in its territory from complying with
§ 1706(a). Canada Issues Order Blocking U.S. Trade Restrictions, External
Affairs and International Trade Canada News Release, Oct. 9, 1992, at 5.
Similarly, Britain has issued an order directing British-based U.S.
subsidiaries not to comply with § 1706(a). U.K. Acts to Counter U.S. Trade
Ban on Cuba, Dept. of Trade and Industry Press Release, Oct. 16, 1992. For
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA
Shortly after Fidel Castro took power in 1959 and
established a socialist regime, the United States imposed
broad economic sanctions against Cuba, which then relied
heavily on U.S. trade.' In late 1960, President Eisenhower
invoked the 1949 Export Control Act9 to ban exports to
Cuba.1" Later that year, the United States banned all Cuban
sugar imports." In February 1961, President Kennedy asked
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy whether it would
"make things more difficult for Castro" if the United States
prohibited Cuban imports, such as tobacco, vegetables, and
fruits. 2 Subsequently, the State Department asked the
Treasury Department to examine the legality of "a complete
economic blockade."13
The Treasury Department determined that "traditional
international law and principles do not afford much support
for the unilateral imposition of such a blockade."'4
Nonetheless, the Treasury Department ultimately suggested
that an embargo be based on section 620(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 19611" and section 5(b) of the Trading with
the Enemy Act."6 Additionally, Treasury Secretary Henry
Fowler suggested that the United States impose the following
restrictions as a means to disrupt the Cuban economy: (1)
prohibiting U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with Cuba;
8 Toward the end of 1958, U.S. imports from, and exports to, Cuba
amounted to approximately 75% of Cuba's total trade. See MORRIS H.
MORLEY, IMPERIAL STATE AND REVOLUTION, THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA,
1952-1986 410 n.93 (1987). See id for a comprehensive discussion of U.S.
policy and economic sanctions against Cuba.
' Export Control Act of 1949, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 2021-32 (1993)).
10 MORLEY, supra note 8, at 121.
"1 PHILIP BRENNER, FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION: U.S.
RELATIONS WITH CUBA 13 (1988).
12 MORLEY, supra note 8, at 188.
14 Id at 189.
15 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 620(a), 75 Stat.
424 (1961), 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1989).
" Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411 (1917)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.S. 904 (1993)).
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(2) terminating aid to countries which send strategic goods,
such as weaponry, to Cuba; (3) sanctioning the transportation
of goods to and/or from Cuba; and (4) preventing foreign trade
with Cuba." With the exception of the fourth restriction,
Secretary Fowler's suggestions were incorporated in the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations,' s which forbade any trade with
Cuba unless authorized by the Secretary of Treasury.
From 1963 until 1975, a near total embargo was imposed
against Cuba and U.S. foreign subsidiaries were effectively
forbidden from engaging in Cuban trade. Although the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations permitted foreign subsidiaries,
except for banking corporations, to trade with Cuba as long as
U.S. goods, dollars, credit, or transport were not involved, such
transactions could only be "incidental to the conduct of
business activities."" If a U.S. foreign subsidiary engaged in
a substantial amount of Cuban trade, its trade license could be
17 MORLEY, supra note 8, at 188.
'a See 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963).
19 31 C.F.R. § 515.541 (1963) (revoked by 40 Fed. Reg. 47,108 (1975))
provided:
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this
section, all transactions incidental to the conduct of business
activities abroad engaged in by any non-banking association,
corporation, or other organization, which is organized and doing
business under the laws of any foreign country in the authorized
trade territory are hereby authorized.
(b) This section does not authorize any transaction involving
United States dollar accounts or any other property subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(c) This section does not authorize any transaction involving the
purchase or sale or other transfer of any merchandise of United
States origin or the obtaining of credit in connection therewith.
(d) This section does not authorize the transportation aboard any
vessel which is owned or controlled by any organization described
in paragraph (a) of this section of any merchandise from a
designated foreign country to any country or from any country
directly or indirectly to a designated foreign country.
(e) This section does not authorize any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States other than an organization
described in paragraph (a) of this section to engage in or participate
in or be involved in any transaction. For the purpose of this section
only, no person shall be deemed to be engaged in or participating
in or involved in a transaction solely because of the fact that he has
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revoked. According to Stanley Sommerfield, then Chief
Counsel for the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury
Department, "[if it develops that a substantial amount of
trade is being conducted by subsidiaries with Cuba (and
constant checks are being made on this point) then the
exemption will be reconsidered."20
Despite the existence of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, the Ford Administration recognized that it
needed to be "flexible about U.S. [foreign] subsidiaries trading
with Cuba so as not to drift into 'conflict situations' with
important allies and 'complicate... [U.S.] relations with those
countries.' ,21 Accordingly, the Ford Administration granted
trade exemptions to U.S. foreign subsidiaries when necessary
to avoid a confrontation with a foreign country. For example,
to avoid a clash with the Canadian government in February
1975, the Ford Administration permitted the Canadian-based
subsidiary of California's Litton Industries, Inc. to sell
$500,000 worth of desks, chairs, and filing cabinets to Cuba.22
In August 1975, after the Organization of American States
lifted its economic embargo of Cuba, the Ford Administration
decided to relax the U.S. restrictions against Cuban trade.2"
Its decision was motivated by the desire to "remove a recurrent
source of friction" between the United States and the foreign
countries that encouraged companies in their territories to
trade with Cuba.24 The United States revised the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations by making the following changes:
"* Stanley L. Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with the
Sino-Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAw. 861, 868 (1963-64).
21 MORLEY, supra note 8, at 277.
"2 Id. at 276-77. The potential for a confrontation was real. Canada's
Trudeau government actively demanded the exemption, and Canadian
Foreign Minister Alastair Gillespie publicly challenged the U.S. regulations
for infringing on Canada's national sovereignty. Moreover, less than a year
before, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had threatened to terminate the
government's relationship with the Canadian-based U.S. subsidiary MLW-
Worthington Ltd. unless the United States permitted the subsidiary to
execute its $15 million contract with Cuba. At that time, the Nixon
Administration chose to ignore the sale while the Canadian government
played down the subsidiary's transaction and abandoned a confrontation
with the United States about the U.S. regulations' violation of Canada's
national sovereignty. Id.
23 Id at 277.
24 Id
19941
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(1) licensing Cuban trade by U.S. subsidiaries based in foreign
countries that encourage such trade,2" (2) licensing ships
involved with Cuban trade to enter U.S. ports,26 and (3)
lifting the ban on aid to foreign countries that trade with
Cuba. 7
In 1978 and 1979, members of Congress urged the Carter
Administration to strengthen restrictions on Cuban trade by
reverting to the pre-1975 policy with respect to U.S. foreign
subsidiaries, in order to punish Cuba for its military
involvement in Angola.2' The Carter Administration rejected
this recommendation because it did not wish to antagonize
other nations or hurt "important bilateral economic
understandings" by extending U.S. law extraterritorially.
21
Under the Reagan Administration, however, the embargo
against Cuba was tightened.30
3. THE CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT OF 1992
During the Bush Administration, Congress made several
proposals to strengthen the Cuban embargo. One of these
proposals, the Mack Amendment, would have prohibited all
U.S. foreign subsidiaries from trading with Cuba. This
amendment was introduced in Congress several times but was
enacted into law only in 1992. The United States feared that
imposing restrictions upon foreign countries would alienate
these nations without resulting in Castro's overthrow. This
hesitation to strengthen the embargo against Cuba was based
25 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1975).
26 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.207, 515.562 (1975).
27 MORLEY, supra note 8, at 277.
28 See Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POLY
INT'L Bus. 319, 333 (1983).29 I1.
'* The Reagan Administration sought to restrict Cuba's access to hard
currency and U.S. goods. Specifically, in 1982, the Treasury Department
restricted the use of U.S. dollars or credit cards to pay travel-related
expenses incurred in Cuba. Additionally, the Treasury Department forced
the shut-down of American Airways Charter of Miami, the major carrier
from the United States to Cuba. These restrictive actions effectively limited
Cuba's tourism business and, thus, the country's revenues. Further adding
to Cuba's economic difficulties, the Reagan Administration maintained
constant pressure on foreign countries to end their trade with Cuba. See
MORLEY, supra note 8, at 337-38.
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on the belief that the Castro government would not fall any
time soon. However, the United States found that the world-
wide decline of communism and the sharp reduction in
financial assistance from the former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe have made the Castro government politically
vulnerable."1 Additionally, the U.S. government found that
increasing internal pressure made the collapse of the Castro
government more likely.3 "  Prompted by these findings,
Congress, with President Bush's approval, adopted the Mack
Amendment as section 1706(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992.8s
"' Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 1702(6).
2 Id. § 1702(7).
" It should be noted that arguments existed against enacting the CDA.
Those rejecting the CDA not only objected to the economic deprivation for
the Cuban people, but also criticized the bill's ineffectiveness in achieving
its purposes and its negative impact on U.S. businesses and foreign
relations. Summarizing arguments against the CDA, Rep. Nancy Johnson
stated:
[T]he market share American subsidiaries provide to Cubais so
small it is easily filled by European and Asian producers. And the
only people that will be hurt are Americans who work hard and who
care a lot about their jobs.
Unfortunately, this bill seeks to punish Castro by punishing
United States companies, United States products, and worst of all,
United Statesjobs. People [are] losing theirjobs. Scheduled layoffs
are already great, and this bill will increase those estimates.
138 CONG. REc. H9090 (1992). Additionally, Rep. Charles B. Rangel
questioned the motivation behind the legislation:
[Ilt appears to me that this bill is not just a legislative
initiative, but it is more of a political statement, and I think.., we
might take a look at this as not being concerned so much about the
future of the people living in Cuba as it is an appeal to the Cuban
Americans in Dade County.
If we really take a look at where we are today, we do find that
the Communist nations that have fallen have done so internally.
It has not done so as a result of the United States providing
sanctions against them.
Id. at H9086. Moreover, according to Sen. Tom Harkin, the United States
lacks authority to implement legislation which impose U.S. laws upon U.S.
subsidiaries operating in other countries. See 138 CONG. REC. S15,081
(1992).
1994]
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3.1. Objectives And Provisions Of The Cuban Democracy Act
The purpose of the Cuban Democracy Act is "to seek a
peaceful transition to democracy and a resumption of economic
growth in Cuba through the careful application of sanctions
directed at the Castro government.""' At the same time,
Congress also expressed an interest in shielding the Cuban
people from as much suffering as possible. The statute
attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory goals by
prohibiting trade with Cuba while permitting humanitarian
assistance to the Cuban people. Specifically, unless licensed
by the Secretary of the Treasury, the statute prohibits ships
from entering U.S. ports if they (1) carry goods in which Cuba
or any of its nationals have an interest or (2) were in Cuba
within 180 days prior to arrival in the United States. 5 As
noted above, the CDA prohibits foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies from trading with Cuba." However, the statute
permits licensed donations of food and medicine to non-
governmental groups or individuals."7 The CDA also permits
U.S. businesses to establish telecommunication services and
facilities in Cuba to provide information to the Cuban people
in order to foster democratic reform."
"' Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 1703(1).
r Id. § 1706(b)(1).
' Id- § 1706(a). Section 1706(a) deprives the Secretary of the Treasury
of its former authority under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to
license U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba. Note, however, that
the regulation only prevents entry into agreements after Oct. 23, 1992.
Contracts made before that date are still valid.
37 Id §§ 1705(b)-(c).
8 Id § 1705(e)(2). To encourage the Cuban government to democratize,
hold free and fair elections, and respect human rights, the CDA offers
rewards to the Cuban government for such changes. Id- § 1708(a).
Incentives include: (1) the U.S government providing food and medical
supplies for humanitarian purposes to Cuba, id. § 1707; (2) the President
lifting restrictions on trade between foreign subsidiaries and Cuba and
allowing ships having been to Cuba or carrying goods of Cuban interest to
dock at U.S. ports, id. §§ 1706(b)(1), 1708(a); and (3) the U.S. government
facilitating Cuba's reentry into the international community and financial
organizations, id. § 1708(b)(1). Additionally, the United States shall provide
emergency relief to Cuba during its transition to democracy. Id.
§ 1708(b)(2). Also, further measures to end the trade embargo shall be
taken. Id. § 1708(b)(3).
[Vol. 14:4
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3.2. Sanctions
Under the CDA, the President may impose sanctions upon
any country that provides assistance to Cuba in a form that is
"more favorable than generally available."" These sanctions
may include: (1) disqualification for assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 196140 or the Arms Export Control
Act 4' and (2) denial of requests to forgive or reduce loans
owed to the U.S. government. 2 The sanctions are valid until
the Castro regime moves toward "democratization and greater
respect for human rights."3 In addition to authorizing the
President to impose sanctions against countries which provide
such assistance, the CDA also permits the Secretary of the
Treasury to impose civil penalties of up to $50,000 against
companies trading with Cuba." Civil penalties, however,
may be imposed only after there has been an opportunity for
an agency hearing and prehearing discovery. Any decision to
impose a civil penalty is subject to judicial review.45
4. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF SECTION 1706(a)
WITH PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Section 1706(a) of the Cuban Democracy Act
unconditionally denies licenses to U.S. foreign subsidiaries for
trade with Cuba, regardless of the particularity of the
situation or the appropriateness of the extraterritorial
provision. Such regulation of U.S. subsidiaries conducting
business abroad offends public international law in three
ways. First, section 1706(a) infringes upon a State's exercise
of national sovereignty. Second, the unconditionality of section
1706(a) does not accommodate those U.S. foreign subsidiaries
caught between the conflicting laws of the United States and
"Id § 1704(b)(2)(A).
4' 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151 et seq. (1992).
41 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751 et seq. (1992).
42 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 1704(bXl)(B).
4Id. § 1703(6).
44Id. § 1710(c)(2). Before the enactment ofthe CDA, the Secretary ofthe
Treasury had only the authority to impose criminal penalties against
violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.701
(1993).
"Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 § 1710(c)(2)(b)(4).
1994]
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another country. Third, section 1706(a) ignores instances
when U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction is unreasonable and, thus,
limited by public international law.
4.1. Extraterritorial Prescriptive Authority
Under accepted principles of international law, a State
generally has the authority to prescribe laws to govern acts
beyond its own borders when those acts: (1) affect the State's
own territory, (2) threaten its national security, or (3) are
conducted by its citizens.46 Of the three bases for asserting
prescriptive jurisdiction extraterritorially-effect, national
security, and nationality-the United States may only rely on
the nationality principle to prescribe section 1706(a).47
Neither the effects nor the national security principle
sufficiently justifies the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe
section 1706(a).
First, trade between a subsidiary domiciled in a foreign
country and Cuba takes place outside of U.S. territory. While
Cuban trade by foreign subsidiaries may affect U.S. foreign
policy toward Cuba, the specific "effect" on the United States
itself is uncertain. Second, trade between U.S. foreign
subsidiaries and Cuba is unlikely to hurt U.S. national
46 Prescriptive authority is defined as follows:
Subject to Section 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its
nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against
a limited class of other state interests.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1986).
"' Generally, the extraterritorial application of law is discouraged. For
this reason, the Cartel Restriction Act of 1979, which imposes a burden on
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
companies to report anti-competitive activity, was not enacted. See Kenneth
R. Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion
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security. In fact, the Inter-American Dialogue's Special
Report48 states:
Deprived of military and economic assistance from the
Soviet Union, with all of its own troops recalled from
abroad, and with its support for foreign insurgencies
sharply curtailed, Cuba can no longer be considered a
threat to the United States or to the nations of Latin
America and the Caribbean.49
Moreover, food and medicine comprise 90% of all exports by
U.S. foreign subsidiaries to Cuba.5" Specifically, 72% or $347
million of the $483 million worth of exports by U.S. foreign
subsidiaries to Cuba consist of food items.51 Plainly, section
1706(a) is more likely to harm the Cuban people than trade
with Cuba is likely to harm U.S. national security.
On the other hand, the nationality of a corporation, as
defined by Comment (d) of section 213 of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, could serve to establish the
nationality principle as the basis for U.S. prescriptive
jurisdiction over the conduct of U.S. foreign subsidiaries.
According to the Restatement, the nationality of a corporation
may be defined as that nation with significant connection to
the corporation, such as substantial corporate ownership by its
nationals, management by its nationals, or location of the
corporation's principal place of business.52 Because section
1706(a) specifically grounds its jurisdictional authority on the
U.S. nationality of those owning and controlling the foreign
subsidiary," the United States could base its prescriptive
authority on the nationality principle.
The traditional rule of public international law, however,
48 The Inter-American Dialogue task force is comprised of approximately
100 Western Hemisphere leaders who periodically review policies and offer
recommendations regarding U.S.-Latin American relations. This report
identifies ways in which the United States may foster greater cooperation
with Latin America.
4, 138 CONG. REC. S14,066 (1992) (statement of Elliot L. Richardson,
Chair, Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Cuba).
8* 138 CONG. REC. H9086 (1992) (statement of Rep. Charles B. Rangel).
8 Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Says U.S. Sanctions Will Hurt Trade, in
Reuters, Nov. 12, 1992.
52 RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 (1986).
5' Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (1993).
1994]
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considers a corporation's nationality to be its state of
incorporation. As businesses generally incorporate in the
State in which they are domiciled, the nationality of U.S.
foreign subsidiaries would likely be their host country. Thus,
the foreign country where U.S. foreign subsidiaries are based
could also claim nationality as the basis for regulating the
conduct of U.S. subsidiaries within its territory. The foreign
country could also claim territoriality and effect to justify
regulating corporate activities conducted within its territory.
4.2. Exercise Of State Sovereignty
Despite U.S. prescriptive authority, based on the nation-
ality principle to apply section 1706(a) extraterritorially, a
foreign country may require U.S. subsidiaries located within
its territory to comply with policies which are contrary to U.S.
law." The authority of a foreign country to regulate conduct
within its territory is known as the exercise of state
sovereignty.5 Acting to protect their national sovereignty,
Canada and Britain have already taken measures to
counteract section 1706(a), which they believe infringes upon
their authority to regulate their own trading interests.
Specifically, Canada and Britain have issued what are known
as "blocking orders" to prohibit U.S. subsidiaries within their
territory from complying with section 1706(a).
4.2.1. Canada's Blocking Order
Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act authorizes
Canada's Attorney General to "issue an order blocking the
application in Canada of foreign legislation or other legal
measures which will have an extraterritorial effect in Canada
r" In general, a State may not require a person
(a) to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of
that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national;
or
(b) to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by
the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a
national.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441(1) (1986).
56 See A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BusINEss AND
NATIONAL JURISDICTION 94 (1988).
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[or]... infringes Canadian sovereignty."" After determining
that section 1706(a) would hurt Canadian trade relations with
Cuba, worth approximately $30 million (Canadian), former
Canadian Attorney General Kim Campbell concluded that
"such displacement of Canadian law and policy by United
States law and policy constitutes an infringement of Canadian
sovereignty."" Accordingly, she issued an order blocking
compliance with section 1706(a), "thereby counteracting the
violation of Canadian sovereignty."58 Although Campbell
recognized that this blocking order would place Canadian-
based U.S. subsidiaries in the difficult position of violating
U.S. law, she placed the blame on the United States for "the
extraterritorial imposition of United States law to Canada in
violation of Canadian sovereignty, and in violation of generally
accepted principles of international law."59 Furthermore, she
asserted that issuing the blocking order was a "necessary
measure to protect and safeguard Canadian sovereignty.'
Specifically, the blocking order requires Canadian-based
U.S. subsidiaries to disregard and report any instructions they
receive from their parent companies ordering them to stop
trading with Cuba." Canada's Department of External
Affairs and International Trade monitors companies' trade
with Cuba and investigates companies that decrease their
Cuban trade. Penalties for violation of this order include fines
of up to $10,000 (Canadian), equivalent to approximately
$8,600 (U.S.), and/or jail sentences of up to five years.6" The
maximum penalties for an indictment or a summary conviction
are $10,000 (Canadian) and $5,000 (Canadian), respectively,
each with the alternative or additional penalty of up to five
years in prison."
56 Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 5 (1985)
(Can.).
s' Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, CAN.
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4.2.2. Britain's Blocking Order
Similarly, Britain's Protection of Trading Interests Act
1980 ("PTIA") enables the British government to counter
extraterritorial measures which adversely affect British
economic interests." Under the PTIA, the British
government, probably the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry and/or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, may
take any or all of three actions to guard British national
sovereignty over the country's economic affairs. First, it may
forbid British persons or businesses, including subsidiaries of
U.S. companies, from complying with foreign laws which
threaten British trade.65  Second, it may forbid British
persons or businesses from complying with a request from
another country to produce documents and/or evidence which
may hurt the sovereignty or security of Britain. " Third, it
may order British courts not to enforce foreign judgments
related to restrictions on British trade.6 " Moreover, any
British persons or businesses may bring an action in a British
court to recover noncompensatory damages imposed by a
foreign court in a trade restriction matter.6 8
Section 1706(a) jeopardizes British trade with Cuba, which
in 1990 was worth approximately $120 million annually,"
and conflicts with the British policy of encouraging "firms to
exploit civil market opportunities in Cuba.' ° For these
reasons, the British government thought it necessary to take
64 Britain's opposition to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
preceded the enactment of the CDA. In fact, disagreement over the
extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust laws, particularly concerning the
shipping industry, dated back to 1964 and led to the Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act. See A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.
J. INT'L L. 257, 258 (1981) (discussing the development of British policy and
legislation limiting the extraterritorial prescription of U.S. laws). Although
the PTIA applies to other countries, it was passed with the United States
in mind. Id. at 257.
65 Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, Mar. 20, 1980, ch. 11, § 1
(U.K.).
ss Id. §§ 2, 4.
67 Id. § 5.
8 Id. § 6.
" British Official Warns Congress Against Interfering in U.K. Trade, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1363 (Sept. 18, 1991).
" U.K. Acts to Counter U.S. Trade Ban on Cuba, supra note 7.
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action under the PTIA to block section 1706(a). According to
Trade Minister Richard Needham:
The British government, not the U.S. Congress, will
determine the U.K.'s policy on trade with Cuba. I will
not accept any attempt to superimpose U.S. law on U.K.
companies.... That is why I have taken action under
the Protection of Trading Interests Act .... I regret
having had to take this step. There was no alternative.
We are determined to safeguard the interests of all
British companies trading with Cuba, whatever their
parentage.1
On October 14, 1992, the British government issued an order
prohibiting British subsidiaries of U.S. companies from
complying with section 1706(a).7" Additionally, British-based
U.S. subsidiaries must report any directives they receive
requiring them to cease trading with Cuba."
4.3. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Under public international law, States have the right to
regulate conduct within their territory, but they cannot compel
their nationals located in a foreign country to act contrary to
the laws of that foreign country. 4 Moreover, States may not
punish their nationals who violate that State's law in order to
comply with foreign law. This doctrine is known as foreign
sovereign compulsion. 5
United States courts recognize foreign sovereign
compulsion as an affirmative defense to charges of violating of
U.S. law. Courts have realized that without such a defense,
defendants would be penalized for complying with the laws of
the foreign country where they are located. United States
71kLC
72 Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Cuban Assets Control
Regulations) Order 1992, Statutory Instruments, 1992, No. 2449 (U.K.).
7, Id.
4RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 441(1) (1986).
7
6 See NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 55.
71 See Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, The Restatement and Foreign
Compulsion: A Plea for Due Process, 23 INT'L LAW. 593 (1989). See
generally Steven J. Hawes, Comment, The Sovereign Compulsion Defense in
Antitrust Actions and the Role of Statements by Foreign Governments, 62
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courts, however, allow the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense only when "true" compulsion exists. Mere
acquiescence to sovereign rule does not rise to the level of
"true" compulsion.
7 7
A line of case law has developed this distinction between
acquiescence and true compulsion. The U.S. Supreme Court
held in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.71 that government authorization to discriminate in
mineral purchases did not constitute compulsion because no
Canadian law required the defendant to engage in
discriminatory activity. Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.7 9 rejected Congoleum Corporation's claim that a patent
granted by a foreign government compelled its practice of
trade monopolization and shielded it from antitrust liability
under U.S. law. In dismissing the defendant's argument that
government approval of a patent constituted compulsion, the
court stated:
Where the governmental action rises no higher than
mere approval, the compulsion defense will not be
recognized. It is necessary that foreign law must have
coerced the defendant into violating [U.S.] law. The
defense is not available if the defendant could have
legally refused to accede to the foreign power's
wishes.8"
Likewise, the Supreme Court in United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp.8 held that Mexican legislation causing the defendant's
practice of trade monopolization did not constitute compulsion,
given the defendant's lobbying efforts for the legislation. Con-
versely, the Court found true compulsion in Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commericales, S.A. v. Rogers,"2 which raised the issue of
WASH. L. REV. 129, 137 (1987).
" See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-
94 (3d Cir. 1979).
78 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
79 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
go Id. at 1293 (citations omitted).
"' 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
82 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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whether Swiss nondisclosure laws relieved the defendant from
liability for refusing to comply with a U.S. discovery order.
The Court recognized that "[the defendant's] failure to satisfy
fully the requirements of this production, order was due to
inability fostered neither by its own conduct nor by
circumstances within its control.""3
Legislation is not the only way compulsion may be effected.
In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,8
a federal district court held that oral instructions to defendant
Texaco from a Venezuelan regulatory agency official compelled
Texaco to discriminate against plaintiff Interamerican
Refining Corp. and was sufficient to constitute sovereign
compulsion. 5 Whatever form the compulsion may take, true
compulsion has three characteristics: the activities (1) occur
within the territory of the foreign sovereign, (2) comply with
the mandate of the foreign government, and (3) are actively
supervised by that government.8"
Section 1706(a) makes no exception for cases where U.S.
foreign subsidiaries face foreign sovereign compulsion to
continue trade with Cuba. For example, Canadian-based U.S.
subsidiaries are not exempt from section 1706(a) even though
they face "true" compulsion from the Canadian government.
These subsidiaries manifest the three characteristics of
compulsion. First, their commercial activity with Cuba occurs
within Canadian territory. Second, the Canadian blocking
order prohibits Canadian-based U.S. subsidiaries from
terminating trade relations with Cuba, requiring
noncompliance with section 1706(a). 7 Finally, the Canadian
government monitors the trade of Canadian-based U.S.
subsidiaries with Cuba and penalizes compliance with section
1706(a).8" In fact, the Canadian government recognized the
8 I& at 211.
84 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
5 d. at 1296.
"See Wallace & Griffin, supra note 76.
'1 For a discussion of the Canadian order blocking § 1706(a), see Section
4.2.1.
88 Currently, the Canadian Justice Department is investigating 20
Canadian-based U.S. subsidiaries which have complied with the directives
from their parent companies demanding that they terminate their Cuban
trade to conform with § 1706(a). Two such Canadian-based U.S.
subsidiaries under investigation are H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd., which
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difficult position of Canadian-based U.S. subsidiaries. It
noted, however, the U.S. judiciary's acceptance of the foreign.
sovereign compulsion defense when it evaluated the impact of
the blocking order.8 9
Although a U.S. court may ultimately exonerate U.S.
subsidiaries in Canada or elsewhere, section 1706(a) should
not, by its categorical language, subject these subsidiaries to
uncertainty and impose upon the U.S. judiciary the costs of
adjudicating such cases. Moreover, section 1706(a) places
these foreign subsidiaries in the uncomfortable position of
appearing to violate U.S. law, and thus tarnish their image as
law abiding corporate citizens. In short, section 1706(a)
should accommodate those cases in which U.S. foreign
subsidiaries are compelled by their domiciliary country to
continue trade with Cuba, just as the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations formerly did. 0 It is neither fair nor efficient to
compel these U.S. foreign subsidiaries to resort to
administrative and judicial proceedings in order to establish
those rights clearly required by public international law and
affirmed by U.S. courts.
4.4. Prescriptive Jurisdiction Limited By Reasonableness
Although the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction
over U.S. foreign subsidiaries, this jurisdiction should be
exercised only when reasonable."' According to the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, in order to
determine the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a
terminated its food exports to Cuba, and Eli Lilly Canada Inc., which
stopped its pharmaceutical sales to Cuba. See Peter Benesh, Canadians
Profit from Connection with Cuba, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993,
(Business) at 1I.
" Anticipating the impact of issuing a blocking order, then Attorney
General Kim Campbell noted that "[s]hould any corporation be prosecuted
in the United States for a violation of the amended regulation, the existence
of this Order can be considered by the American courts." Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, CAN. GAZ. Part II,
Vol. 126, No. 22.
SO Section 1706(a) of the CDA overrides § 515.559 of the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
license U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba when their host country
favors such trade. See supra note 4.
9, See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1986).
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person or activity, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) [T]he link of the activity to the territory of the
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity
takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or
economic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the
importance of regulation to the regulating state, the
extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be
protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with
the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an
interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state.92
There would undoubtedly be instances when applying
section 1706(a) would be unreasonable considering these eight
factors. In fact, applying section 1706(a) may often fail to
meet many of the eight factors of reasonableness. First, the
link between the United States and the regulated activity may
be tenuous. The activity occurs outside of U.S. territory. Any
effect on the United States may be the debatable
strengthening of U.S. attempts to isolate Cuba economically.
Second, the U.S. foreign subsidiary may not be connected to
the United States. Its places of nationality, residence, and
economic activity may all be outside of U.S. territory. At least,
the places of residence and economic activity of most U.S.
foreign subsidiaries would not be within the United States.
*2 Id. § 403(2) (1986).
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Third, although the United States may consider it important
to terminate all trade with Cuba, not all countries share this
perspective." In fact, no other country forbids its foreign
based subsidiaries to trade with Cuba. Moreover, the United
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution seeking to end
the U.S.-Cuba embargo, suggesting international disapproval
of the CDA."4 Fourth, other countries may rely on the
subsidiary trade and expect to regulate such trade as part of
their national economy. Section 1706(a) threatens these
interests. Fifth, the importance of section 1706(a) to the
international political, legal, and economic system may be
questionable given the United Nations General Assembly's
reconsideration of the Cuban embargo and the counter-
measures taken by countries such as Britain and Canada.
Sixth, section 1706(a) may be greatly inconsistent with
international traditions. 5 As discussed in Section 4.2 of this
Comment, the U.S. law may infringe upon a State's
sovereignty. Additionally, as discussed in Section 4.3, the U.S.
law may subject U.S. foreign subsidiaries to foreign sovereign
compulsion. Seventh, a State may have a great interest in its
subsidiaries' Cuban trade, depending on the extent and
importance of the trade to its national economic interests.
Finally, the potential for conflict between U.S. and foreign law
may be real. The Canadian blocking order, for example,
's Canada, for example, protested vigorously against the U.S. attempt to
override Canadian authority to regulate its own trade. According to former
Attorney General of Canada, Kim Campbell, § 1706(a) "would be an
unacceptable intrusion of U.S. law into Canada and could adversely affect
significant Canadian interests in relation to international trade or
commerce. Canadian companies will carry out business under the laws and
regulations of Canada, not those of a foreign country." Canada Issues Order
Blocking U.S. Trade Restrictions, External Affairs and International Trade
Canada News Release, No. 199, Oct. 9, 1992.
" A year before the enactment of the CDA, the United Nations General
Assembly refused to consider a resolution which sought to end U.S.
economic sanctions against Cuba. Soon after the enactment of the CDA,
however, the General Assembly not only voted on but passed the resolution.
Although 79 member countries of the General Assembly abstained, 57
nations passed the resolution with only the United States, Israel, and
Romania voting against it. This change in perspective toward the U.S.-Cuba
embargo reflects international resentment of the extraterritorial expansion
of U.S. policy through the CDA.
"s International law recognizes the authority of a State to regulate
conduct within its territory. See NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 55, at 12.
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presents such a direct conflict.
Although the United States may have the authority to
regulate the conduct of U.S. foreign subsidiaries in some
instances, situations may arise when exercising jurisdiction to
prescribe section 1706(a) is unreasonable under the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. In such cases, public
international law requires that the United States refrain from
applying section 1706(a) to those U.S. foreign subsidiaries.
Moreover, even when prescribing section 1706(a) is reasonable,
where there is conflict with another country that has a greater
expectation and interest in regulating the subsidiaries' trade,
the United States should defer to that nation and moderate its
prescriptive authority accordingly. 6  Thus, the
unconditionality of section 1706(a) contravenes public
international law.
Before the enactment of section 1706(a), the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations permitted the Secretary of the Treasury
to respect foreign laws and/or policies that require or favor
trade with Cuba and to license, under certain circumstances,
U.S. subsidiaries domiciled in those foreign countries to trade
with Cuba. The Secretary of the Treasury had the
authority to license Cuban trade by U.S. foreign subsidiaries
so long as the trade did not include strategic exports, U.S.
technical data, unauthorized U.S. parts, unauthorized U.S.-
origin spares, U.S. dollar accounts, or long-term financing by
a U.S. entity.9 8 The Cuban Assets Control Regulations
enabled the United States to take a case-by-case approach and
to restrict trade by U.S. foreign subsidiaries only where there
is no competing foreign interests. Section 1706(a), by
withholding licenses for U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with
Cuba under any circumstances, expands U.S. law
According to the Restatement:
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to
exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions
by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to
evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a
state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(3) (1986).
'7 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1993).
98 IdL
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extraterritorially without regard for the competing interests or
rights of a foreign sovereign which may outweigh U.S.
interests. Because section 1706(a) violates public
international law, it should be repealed.
5. ECONOMIC RAMIFICATIONS
Section 1706(a) should also be repealed and the embargo
against Cuba should be lifted for self-interested economic
reasons. The long-standing embargo against Cuba has already
hurt U.S. companies by excluding them from participation in
Cuban trade while their foreign competitors advance in the
Cuban market. Section 1706(a) only further disadvantages
U.S. companies at a time when Cuba is courting foreign
investment. Moreover, restricting the activities of U.S. foreign
subsidiaries located in foreign countries threatens the
reliability and competitiveness of U.S. businesses. In short,
section 1706(a) harms the U.S. business community as it hurts
the Cuban economy.
5.1. The Cuban Market
Historically, Cuba has had one of the strongest economies
in the Caribbean basin. From 1965 to 1980, it had an annual
industrial growth rate of 6.3%." Recently, however, the
Cuban economy has stagnated because its primary benefactor,
the former Soviet Union, is no longer able to provide it
significant financial support.1" In fact, Soviet aid decreased
73%, dropping from $8.1 billion in 1989 to $2.2 billion in
1992.101 Cuba's economy suffered greatly; its gross domestic
"Kenneth P. Jameson, U.S.-Cuban Economic Relations in the 1990s, in
U.S.-CuBAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990S 209, 217 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Rafael
Hernandez eds., 1989).
'o Cuban trade relied greatly on trade with the former Soviet Union and
socialist countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. From
1959 until 1988, Cuban trade with the former Soviet Union amounted to
60.3% of its external trade. Trade with socialist countries of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, totaled 87% of all Cuban trade in 1988 and
80% of foreign investment in Cuba from 1959 until the early 1990s. Jose
Luis Rodriguez, Economic Relations Between Cuba and Eastern Europe:
Present Situation and Possible Developments, in CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY
CONFRONTS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 53, 53-54 (H. Michael Erisman
& John M. Kirk eds., 1991).
'"1 Recovery Predicted for Cuba Under Certain Circumstances, Daily Rep.
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product shrank by 20% in 1991 and may continue to plummet
by as much as 60%.1°2
Despite Cuba's current economic crisis, foreign investors
continue to see great financial promise in the Cuban
market.0's  According to Vicente Gutierrez Camposeco,
president of Mexico's National Association of Manufacturing
Industry, "the future of ... [Cuba is certain, and] Mexican
investments in that country will continue to be strengthened
without fears."1 4  Cuba's production of nickel, its major
revenue generating export, should double by the end of the
decade."° In addition, Cuba may increase its hard currency
through exports of metallic nickel products."°  The recent
revision of the Cuban constitution, reducing state ownership
from all means of production to ownership of the
"fundamental" means of production, indicates the government's
willingness to permit privatization in an effort to encourage
foreign investment."°  Additionally, Cuba is considering
providing foreign investors with incentives such as special tax
benefits, repatriation of all profits, and duty-free import of
supplies.1°s
for Exec. (BNA) (Dec. 23, 1992). Reduction in Soviet oil caused a series of
adverse effects on the Cuban economy. Shortages of fuel, fertilizer, and
spare parts reduced Cuba's recent sugar harvest to six million tons, the
lowest since 1975, and forced factories to shut down, raising unemployment
to about 10%. The decline in production reduced the gross domestic product
to an estimated $20.3 billion in 1992, down from $32.8 billion in 1989.
Capitalism, Castro Style, BUS. WEEK, Aug. 3, 1992, at 36. Consequently,
Cuba lost half of its buying power, formerly at approximately $4 billion.
Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Believes it Has Right Strategy to Survive Economic
Crisis, Reuter Bus. Rep., May 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fin File.
10 Michael G. Wilson, Hastening Castro's Downfall, Heritage Found.
Rep., July 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
... Mexicans See Good Business Prospects in Cuba, Reuter Bus. Rep.,
Dec. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
14 Id.
,'* Pascal Fletcher, Cuban Nickel Industry Expands Into World Market,
in Reuter Libr. Rep., May 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fin
File.
109d.
107 Capitalism, Castro Style, supra note 101, at 37.
""Tim Golden, Cuba's Economy, Cast Adrift, Grasps at Capitalist
Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at Al, A6.
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5.1.1. Investment
Given Cuba's economic recession, the Cuban government is
particularly anxious to promote foreign investment and
commercial trade.' Accordingly, Castro has relaxed trade
restrictions to facilitate joint ventures between foreign and
Cuban companies."0  An estimated fifty to sixty joint
venture agreements or other financial partnerships have been
established, and 200 more are under negotiation.'
Castro is particularly interested in developing the tourism
industry."2  European countries are investing heavily in
Cuba in anticipation of a thriving tourist business."' Six
hotels financed by foreign investment have been constructed
since 1990, and Mexico recently agreed to a $15 million joint
investment in tourism."" Additionally, the Cuban
government, with the support of foreign partners, plans to
build 3,000 to 4,000 hotel rooms each year until 1995. The
government expects to recover this investment within three
years." 5
'09 In October 1991, Castro met with leaders of Mexico, Venezuela, and
Colombia to discuss business prospects between Cuba and their nations. See
Mexico Shows Growing Interest in Cuba for Investment, Despite U.S.
Embargo, Intl Fin. Daily (BNA) (Nov. 20, 1991) available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Fin File. In June 1992, Castro welcomed 125 potential foreign
investors to the government palace for business talks. See Damian Fraser,
Cuban Revolutionary in an Army Green Business Suit, FIN. TIMES, July 14,
1992, at 4.
Actually, as early as 1982, Cuba expressed an interest in encouraging
foreign investment and, thus, enacted its Joint Venture Law of 1982, Decree
No. 50, which allows for 50% foreign ownership in Cuban businesses. See
Gareth Jenkins, Western Europe and Cuba's Development in the 1980s and
Beyond, in CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY CONFRONTS A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ORDER, supra note 100, at 183, 192. In 1988, Cuba's Foreign Trade Ministry
launched a campaign to attract foreign industrial ventures, particularly
with former West Germany and Japan. Id. at 189.
... Stephen Fidler, Investors Find the Door Ajar in Cuba, FIN. TIMES,
July 29, 1992, at 4.
12Howard W. French, Castro Steels a Suffering Nation for
Confrontation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1992, at A3.
1" Heads of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela Call for End to U.S. Blockade
of Cuba, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 30, 1991).
"" As an example, the 218-room, $18 million Tuxpan Hotel, is a 50-50
joint venture between Cuba and Mexican real estate developer CDC
Inmobiliaria. Capitalism, Castro Style, supra note 101, at 37. See also
Mexicans See Good Business Prospects in Cuba, supra note 103.
115 Fidler, supra note 111.
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Other than tourism, foreign countries are investing in
industries such as construction, electronics, plastics, and
biotechnology." In addition, a number of foreign banks
have approached Cuba about the possibility of opening branch
offices on the island."" Foreign companies are also eager to
help Cuba meet the need created by the withdrawal of Soviet
oil supplies. France's Total, Brazil's Petrobras, Sweden's
Taurus Petroleum, and Canada's Northwest Energy have
already finalized or are in the process of finalizing agreements
with Cuba to search for oil." 8
5.1.2. Trade
Many foreign countries are already actively trading with
Cuba. Britain exports products such as chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, and food to Cuba and receives Cuban rum,
tobacco, and citrus products."" Canadian trade with Cuba
consists mainly of nickel imports. 2 ' Iran, South Korea, and
Morocco recently began importing Cuban sugar.'' Other
countries trading with Cuba include France, Spain,
Switzerland, West Germany, and Italy."s  Recognizing the
potential of Cuban trade, increasing numbers of foreign
businesses are exploring opportunities in Cuba. The British
company Body Shop International PLC is considering
purchasing natural ingredients such as eucalyptus, lime, basil,
and tangerine from Cuba.'" Canadian companies hope to
lie I&.
" Pascal Fletcher, Cuban Banking Sector Draws Foreign Interest,
Reuters, Nov. 11, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fin File.
118 Capitalism, Castro Style, supra note 101, at 36.
... British Business Executives Explore Opportunities in Cuba, Reuters,
June 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fin File.
... Canadians Pursue Cuban Mining Deals, CHi. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1993,
at Fil.
... Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Plays Down U.S. Sanctions Impact on Sugar
Trade, Reuter Bus. Rep., Oct. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fin File.
11 Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Special Report:
An Analysis of Licensed Trade with Cuba by Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S.
Companies (1992).
', Pascal Fletcher, British Cosmetics Group Explores Opportunities in
Cuba, Reuter Bus. Rep., June 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Fin File.
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tap into Cuba's sources of precious and base metals, such as
copper, lead, zinc, silver, and gold.'" Mexican businessmen
are interested in trade with Cuba in commodities, including
pharmaceutical and medical products, beauty aids, textiles,
foods, and electrical equipment.'25 According to Frank
Smeenk, head of the Toronto-based MacDonald Mining, a gold
prospecting firm which will enter into a joint-venture with the
Cuban government, there are "lots and lots of business
opportunities in that country. It will absorb billions of dollars
in capital."'2 6
Any decrease in trade by U.S. foreign subsidiaries merely
presents greater opportunities to foreign businesses already
exploiting or intending to exploit the growing Cuban
market. 27 For example, according to Carrier Co., a supplier
of air conditioners to Cuba before section 1706(a) came into
effect, European and Asian companies are more than eager to
acquire the $10-20 million trade abandoned by Carrier. 2 '
As long as other countries do not restrict their trade with
Cuba, the U.S. objective of economically crippling the Castro
government cannot be achieved.
,24 Canadians Pursue Cuban Mining Deals, supra note 120.
12 Mexican Business Confident of Increased Investment in Cuba, Notimex
Mexican News Service, Dec. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS,-Nexis Library,
Fin File.
126 Canadians Profit from Connection with Cuba, supra note 88.
12 I. Furthermore, agricultural export embargoes generally fail due to
the lack of effective enforcement, according to Thomas Kay, administrator
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service. Given
the massive global market in agricultural products, it is extremely difficult
to monitor U.S. agricultural shipments to ensure that they do not reach
embargoed destinations. The difficulty in distinguishing U.S. agricultural
products from those of other countries complicates the problem of tracking
any embargoed shipments. That other countries which purchase U.S.
agricultural products could ship their own products to the embargoed
destination creates a loophole to circumvent such an embargo. Moreover,
agricultural trade embargoes, according to Kay, are ineffective in promoting
foreign policy objectives. 138 CONG. REC. H9084 (1992). Of all the forms of
economic pressure, an import control has been considered the most effective.
See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY & CURRENT POLICY 89 (1985).
128 138 CONG. REC. S14,058, 14,064 (1992).
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5.2. Economic Impact
Section 1706(a) relegates U.S. businesses to the sidelines,
while foreign companies capitalize upon the business potential
in Cuba. Indeed, many U.S. corporations and their foreign
subsidiaries recognize, and wish to avail themselves of, the
lucrative opportunities available in Cuba. This interest in
Cuban trade and investment is not new. Prior to the
enactment of the CDA, many U.S. foreign subsidiaries sought
licenses from the Treasury Department to trade with Cuba
under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.' From 1981
to 1991, the Treasury Department received 2,549 license
applications.3 0  During the same period, U.S. foreign
subsidiaries conducted $3.765 billion worth of trade with
Cuba.' Of the $3.765 billion in trade in that ten-year
period, $780.9 million came from subsidiaries based in Britain,
$1.56 billion from those based in Switzerland, $479.89 million
from those based in Canada, $197 million from those based in
Bermuda, $349.29 million from those based in Argentina,
$34.79 million from those based in Panama, $86.13 million
from those based in France, $80.87 million from those based
in Spain, $50.20 million from those based in Mexico, and
$75.92 million from those subsidiaries based in the West
Indies.' From 1982 to 1991, trade between U.S. foreign
subsidiaries and Cuba increased more than two-fold. 33
5.2.1. Undermining Business Reliability And
Competitiveness
The extraterritorial application of restrictive U.S. trade
laws effectively limits business opportunities and overall
economic activity by discouraging foreign businesses from
investing or merging with U.S. companies for fear of being
121 31 C.F.R. § 515.559 (1993).
,8 Office of Foreign Assets Control, supra note 122.
I &d According to the Treasury Department, trade between Cuba a~d
foreign subsidiaries totaled $253 million in 1982; $142 million in 1983; $275
million in 1984; $288 million in 1985; $354 million in 1986; $243 million in
1987; $246 million in 1988; $332 million in 1989; $705 million in 1990; and
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subjected to U.S. law.M For instance, the U.K. Monopolies
and Mergers Commission prohibited a merger between
Enserch, a U.S. corporation, and Davy, a British company, out
of concern that U.S. export laws would extraterritorially
restrict the post-merger company's activity.135  Unlike
section 1706(a), which affects only U.S. foreign subsidiaries,
this negative impact on U.S. companies is not limited to the
short term or to a narrow sector of business.
5.2.2. Economic Loss Due To Embargo
The estimates indicate that U.S. trade with Cuba could be
worth as much as $3.8 billion per year.136 Additionally, U.S.
consumers could save a considerable amount of money if trade
restrictions were relaxed. U.S. consumers pay more for goods
purchased elsewhere than they would for comparable goods
purchased from Cuba.""7 The price differential is largely due
to savings from reduced transportation costs, given the
proximity of Cuba to the United States."' For instance,
buying sugar from Cuba rather than Asia would save the
United States $13 per ton of sugar.' Similarly, the United
States could save between $500 and $800 per ton of
nickel.' 4 The United States could save another $34 million
a year buying citrus products from Cuba rather than
Brazil.141
'" The International Chamber of Commerce, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 35 (Dieter G. Lange & Gary B. Born eds.,
1987).
13" Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Enserch Corporation and Davy
Corporation Limited: A Report on the Proposed Merger (1981).
"3 Alfonso C. Montero & Pedro M. Gonzalez, Cuba and the United States:
The Potential of Their Economic Relations, in U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE
1990S, supra note 99, at 235, 242. If the United States were to normalize
relations with Cuba, air travel between the two countries would be "very
substantial." Torricelli, Hamilton Oppose Idea that Cuban Trade Embargo
Be Eased, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1841 (Dec. 18, 1991). In fact, a plan has
already been devised to handle the increase in air traffic. Id.
13 Montero & Gonzalez, supra note 136, at 243.
139 Id.
14 Id. at 244.
141 Larry Luxner, Cuba Cultivating Citrus Presence; The Communist
Nation is Increasing Exports to Europe, but Embargoes Prevent Trade with
the United States, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 5, 1993, at F1.
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While the trade embargo cost Cuba $11.5 billion for the
period from 1960 until 1987, it cost the United States $30
billion for the period from 1960 to 1985." It is estimated
that between 1965 and 1986, the embargo cost the United
States nearly $2 billion in lost export sales of corn, cotton,
potatoes, rice, wheat, flour, dry milk, and poultry.143 A joint
study by the Center for Business and Economic Research at
Arkansas State University and the School for Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University concluded
that from 1965 to 1986, 4,500 jobs were lost as a result of the
embargo.'"
The harm that section 1706(a) inflicts upon U.S. businesses
is real and considerable. Carrier Co. estimates that it will lose
between $10 and $20 million because its foreign subsidiaries
can no longer trade with Cuba."5  At least 103 U.S.
companies whose foreign subsidiaries have been trading with
Cuba since 1985 will be similarly affected." According to
Donna Rich Kaplowitz, one of the authors of the Johns
Hopkins University study and a consultant on the Cuban
market, "there's no question [that] the U.S. is losing business
to Europe, Canada, and South America. .... The best beaches
are being divided by Canada, Spain, and Italy."" Already,
it may be too late for the United States to find a foothold in
the Cuban market. In telecommunications, for example, Ital-
cable recently entered into a $65 million joint venture to
service Cuba's overseas calls, pushing AT&T out of the
market." '
In 1985, former New York Congressman Ted Weiss
14 Jameson, supra note 99, at 209.
43 138 CONG. REC. H9084, 9093 (1992).
14 Id.
14 138 CONG. REc. S14,058, 14,064 (1992).
1Id. Such companies include ALCOA, Borg-Warner, Beatrice
Companies, Bonnie Bell, Caterpillar, Dow Chemical, Drexel Burnham
Lambert, E.I. Dupont, Eli Lilly, Exxon, Ford Motor, GTE International,
General Electric, Gillette, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Honeywell, IBM
World Trade, ITT, Ingersoll-Rand, International Multifoods, Johnson and
Johnson, Mennen, Philipp Brothers, RCA Global, R.J. Reynolds, Rohm &
Haas, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, and Westinghouse Electric. I&
47 Cyndee Miller, Cuba Looks for Investors; U.S. Firms Would Be Glad




Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
recognized that "[olur economic denial of Cuba has really
amounted to self-denial, cutting off a major market for
American manufactured goods."149  Similarly, in 1988,
Representative Bill Alexander urged limits on the agricultural
trade embargo against Cuba because of the loss of $450 million
of business to rice farmers. 50 Far from improving U.S.-
Cuban economic relations, section 1706(a) further excludes
U.S. businesses from the Cuban market. According to Senator
Christopher Dodd, section 1706(a) "is not going to hurt Fidel
Castro one bit. It is going to do serious damage to a lot of
companies in this country, and a lot of jobs will be lost in the
process."' 5 '
With the hope that the Cuban embargo will ultimately be
lifted, many U.S. companies have been preparing to enter the
Cuban market. Cuba/USA Venture Enterprises, Inc. was
established in 1991 to provide advisory and management
services to companies interested in competing for future Cuban
trade.' Similarly, U.S. entrepreneurs are preparing for the
moment when the embargo is lifted and they may conduct
business with Cuba. The chairman of the Cuban American
National Fund, an organization studying the economic
conditions and markets in Cuba, plans to raise $19 billion to'
purchase Cuban businesses and resources."'5  Thomas
Herzfeld, head of the Miami-based Herzfeld Advisors, founded
and registered a $10 million investment company, The First
Cuba Fund, Inc., which will purchase stock in, or enter into
joint ventures with, companies trading with Cuba.'
According to a report by the Greater Miami Chamber of
1" Also in the News, Int'l Trade Rep., Jan. 23, 1985, available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, Intrad File.
' Administration Opposes Legislative Limits on Authority to Impose
Farm Trade Embargoes, Int'l Trade Rep., June 15, 1988, available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, Intrad File.
.51 House Follows Senate Lead in Voting to Tighten U.S. Embargo
Against Cuba, Int'l Trade Rep., Sept. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, Intrad File.
1' New South Florida Group to Acquire Companies to Prepare for
Business in a Free Cuba, Bus. Wire, May 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wire File.
" Running the Cuban Agenda: Mas & Co. Are on a Roll, S. FLA. Bus.
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Commerce:
There are cruise shipping lines which have contingency
plans to get into Cuba quickly. Fast food and car rental
franchises have already been awarded and can be made
operational at a very short notice. The Port of Miami
and the Miami International Airport are the logical
points through which Cuba will export sugar, nickel,
fish, tobacco, citrus and other commodities. Similarly,
flowing ... [into Cuba] will be consumer products,
machinery, computers, medical equipment, pharma-
ceutical and construction equipment needed to rebuild
Cuba's infrastructure. 5
Until the embargo is lifted, U.S. entrepreneurs can only watch
their foreign competitors control markets which could
otherwise be theirs.
6. CONCLUSION
As early as 1985, former Representative Weiss introduced
legislation in Congress seeking to end trade sanctions and to
establish full diplomatic relations with Cuba. 5 ' He argued
that the embargo has not isolated or destabilized the Castro
government, but has only hurt U.S. business interests. 5
By enacting the CDA, particularly section 1706(a), the
United States has violated public international law, alienated
allied nations,' and weakened U.S. business
competitiveness. Moreover, the Cuban Democracy Act has
brought international attention and condemnation of U.S.
attempts to control other sovereigns' public policies. 5" The
15 Canute James, Dreaming of a Big Return to Profit, FIN. TIMEs, Dec.
12, 1991, § 1 at 8.1" House Follows Senate Lead in Voting to Tighten U.S. Embargo
Against Cuba, supra note 151.
15 Canada's External Affairs Minister Joe Clark warned that § 1706(a)
would have a negative impact on U.S.-owned enterprises in Canada and on
the United States' relationship with Canada. See Canada Orders Firms Not
to Comply with U.S. Ban on Trade with Cuba, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1699
(Nov. 7, 1990).
'" See generally Paul A. Shneyer & Virginia Barta, The Legality of the
U.S. Economic Blockade of Cuba Under International Law, 13 CAsE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 451 (1981) (arguing that the Cuban blockade is illegal under both
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
irony is that in attempting to destabilize Castro's regime, the
United States may have actually prolonged Castro's
tenure." °
traditional and contemporary international law).
160 According to a fifth-grade Cuban girl, in a speech to several hundred
cheering soldiers, 'wie are more determined now than ever that only
socialism will make us free. Our loyalty is to Fidel. Down with the ...
[Cuban Democracy Act]. Socialism or death." See Douglas Farah, Castro
Uses Stiffer U.S. Embargo to Justify Economic Straits, WASH. PosT, Dec. 17,
1992, at A33.
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